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Aim: As the decision-making science progresses, in recent years, there has been an 
increasing discussion about non-cognitive components involved in decision-making 
process. This paper aims to provide an inclusive overview of current knowledge on the 
state of the science related to the role of values and emotions in decision making. In an 
effort to provide the most inclusive review possible, internal rationality, awareness of 
values, and practical wisdom will be considered. 
Method: It was conducted a comprehensive narrative review of literature on the topic 
of interest. 
Results: Sharp distinction between rational and emotional decisions would be a false 
dichotomy. Both values and emotions underpin every aspect of a decision-making 
process. Interpersonal comparisons of value judgments are thought of as being inherent 
in the very activity of interpretation. This is important when considering reasonableness 
of another’s decision. Moreover, as decision-makers has to be aware of and then 
navigate their own, feelings and values, it is noticeable that emotions may not only 
affect the development of the values of an individual, but also affect an individual’s 
introspective awareness of her values, beliefs and preferences. Finally, it is interesting 
to note that it has been suggested an alternative approach to decision-making 
competence based on decision-maker’s practical wisdom.  
Conclusion:  The ways by which beliefs, values, and emotions affect decision-making 
processes seem to be unclear and overlapping, thus giving a boost to uncertainties. 
Further research into complexities related to the role of values and emotions in decision 
making seems to be necessary.   
 




Corresponding Author:  
Polychronis Voultsos, Medical Law and Ethics, Laboratory of Forensic Medicine & 
Toxicology, Department of Medicine, Faculty of Health Sciences, Aristotle University 
of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, Telephone number: 00306932727580/ 
0030231-0-999285, email: voultsop@otenet.gr 
 




Decision-making process is a dynamic, 
rigorous and complex process. Less 
than perfect cognitive functions do not 
necessarily mean incompetence to 
make treatment decisions. Furthermore, 
perfect cognitive functions do not 
always suffice to make autonomous 
treatment decisions. Modern theory 
shifts the focus from providing as much 
information as possible   towards 
obtaining better communication 
between physician and patient. Patients 
should be actively involved in the 
treatment (shared) decision making. 
They should be empowered and ‘fully’ 
engaged in the treatment decision 
making process with their own core 
values (strictly and stably related to 
their narrative identity), preferences 
and emotions. As the decision-making 
science progresses, in recent years, 
there has been an increasing discussion 
about non-cognitive components 
involved in decision-making process. 
Great emphasis is placed on values and 
emotions rather than on cognitive 
functions. This paper provides a 
narrative review of the currently 
available literature related to values and 
emotions attempting a comprehensive 
approach. In an effort to provide the 
most inclusive review possible, internal 
rationality, awareness of values, and 
practical wisdom will be considered in 
the discussion of the role of values and 
emotions in patient treatment decision 
making. 
Values and emotions play crucial role 
in decision-making process  
There is much and longstanding 
controversy surrounding the 
components and the criteria of decision-
making process, especially those 
related to mental skills and abilities. 
The traditional criteria for decision-
making competence assessment are 
mainly based on assessment of the 
following cognitive functions: 
understanding, appreciation, reasoning, 
and evidencing/expressing a choice 
(Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998).  
Fields and Calvert (2015), after having 
conducted a review regarding informed 
consent procedures with cognitively 
impaired patients, they concluded that 
‘evaluating the capacity of patients with 
cognitive impairment to understand 
treatment options is vital for valid 
informed consent and should be guided 
by best practices.’ However, the 
cognitive criteria of decision-making 
competence have been widely and 
strongly criticized for 
underemphasizing the role of emotions 
and values.  Already Benaroyo and 
Widdershoven (2004) had emphasized 
the role of the overall context of a 
decision-maker and the meaning of the 
decisions to her in the assessment of her 
decision-making competence, thus 
involving consideration of values.  
Although emotions and values are 
peripheral to decision-making process, 
they are strongly thought of (at both 
theoretical and empirical level) as 
playing significant role in decision-
making. Although the cognitive-
focused approach of the decision-
making competence has found support 
in scholarship (Crisp, 2017), there are 
scholars who raise a number of 
considerations in favor of the emotion-
focused (Sullivan-Bissett, 2017; 
Charland, 1998b) or the value-focused 
approach (Tan et al., 2006; Karel et al., 
2010) of the decision-making 
competence.  
Hyper-cognitive functions, namely, 
perfect understanding and appreciation 
of the information provided are not 
necessarily requirements for decision-
making capacity. According Friedman 
‘autonomous choice…does not need to 
be highly deliberate or deliberated’ 
(Friedman 2003, p. 8). Irrationality does 
not mean lack of decision-making 
competence. Evaluative and emotive 
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capacity as well as other skills e.g. 
imagination and retrospection are 
thought of as being able to compensate   
the cognitive functions deficit. 
Friedman states that ‘emotions and 
desires, as well as imagination, can 
constitute a kind of reflection or 
attention to objection or values of 
concern’ (Friedman 2003, p. 10). Not 
surprisingly, in assessment of 
decisional capacity, the shifting of 
focus from cognitive capacity towards 
emotive and/or evaluative capacity is 
facilitated when considering autonomy 
on the relational account of the notion. 
Indeed, the cognitive-focused approach 
of decision-making competence is a 
matter of ‘self-made man’, this is to say, 
a matter of ‘substantive independence 
and self-reliance, social isolation and 
hyper-rationality’ (Stoljar, 2015). 
Given that the model of ‘self-made 
man’ is related to the “‘masculinist’ 
ideals of personhood” (Stoljar, 2015), 
the cognitive-focused approach of 
decisional capacity is not endorsed by 
feminist moral philosophers.  
The approaches of decision-making 
procedure that are not cognitive-
focused open doors to appropriate 
alternative consent procedures. This is 
of considerable importance in case of 
questionable decision-making capacity 
(Fields and Calvert, 2015) as is the 
cases with mental disorder. Mentally ill 
persons do no way lack decision-
making competence for the only reason 
they are mentally disordered 
(Radoilska, 2012). Mental disorder 
does not necessarily involve a loss of 
personal autonomy. This consideration, 
among other things serves the purposes 
of the principle of justice. Given that 
biases (based on prejudice, 
discrimination or other use of 
asymmetry) against patients may be 
caused by simple disagreement with 
proposed medical treatment, it is much 
more likely the bias against mentally ill 
decision-makers. For instance, by 
focusing on an agent’s capacity to value 
we might show respect to marginal 
agency as in the case of (not advanced) 
dementia, in light of the assumption that 
a person is not only memory but also 
wills, emotions, beliefs, and values that 
may remain stable before, during and 
after a decision-making process and 
hence should be thought of as having 
crucial role in assessment of decision-
making competence (Jaworska, 1999).  
Nonetheless, it is crucial to bear in mind 
that the specific way in which values 
and emotions affect decision-making 
process remain by and large unknown. 
They may affect decision-making in 
substantive or procedural way 
(Hermann et al., 2016). Note, however, 
that these two ways are overlapping and 
the distinction between them remains 
blurred (Hermann et al., 2016). Further, 
there is a conceptual overlap between 
values and emotions and interplay 
between cognition and emotion 
(Hermann et al., 2016; Pessoa, 2010; 
Balconi et al., 2017). Besides, it is also 
crucial to bear in mind that the 
cognitive, emotive and evaluative 
capacity of a patient may fluctuate over 
time, especially in the presence of 
mental illness (Fields and Calvert, 
2015).  
Below, some more details are provided 
about the role of values and emotions in 
decision-making process. 
First. Emotions and cognitive 
procedure of decision-making are 
strictly interwoven. Interestingly, it is 
arguably stated that ‘emotions are no 
longer considered structurally opposed 
to reason’ (de Sousa, 2017).  
Emotions are complex and 
contextualized continuous interaction 
between conscious, unconscious and 
fringe conscious processes (Baars, 
1993). Interestingly, there are 
peripheral ‘fringe’ experiences that may 
occur while we are focused on 
something else (Baars, 1993).These 
experiences may involve signals such as 
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feelings and contents which are pre-
conscious, namely, ‘momentarily 
inaccessible’ (Balconi et al., 2017).  
A person may feel various kinds of 
emotions in varying degrees. Emotions 
are positive contributing components in 
decision-making capacity (Charland, 
1998a; Charland 1998b). A certain 
degree (not lack or excess) of emotional 
involvement seems to be essential for a 
person to appreciate (understand in 
more experiential sense) the external 
and internal to her world including her 
current situation as well as personal 
values, and then to set goals of a 
meaningful and engaged life, thus 
promoting their well-being (Charland, 
1998a). Cognitive empathy and 
emotion are associated with increased 
decisional capacity (Supady et al., 
2011). A decision-maker should pay 
attention to emotions to decide whether 
a certain decision effectively promotes 
her well-being (Silverman, 1997). 
Importantly, cognition inherently 
involves emotion. Decision-making 
competence in (complex, intertwined, 
“unpredictable and idiosyncratic”) real 
life could be viewed as practical 
thought that involves appreciation. As 
such it requires emotional involvement 
(Damasio, 1994, pp: 3-83; de Sousa, 
1990, p: 330; Pepper-Smith et al., 
1996). Without emotional involvement 
practical thought (judgment) may be at 
a loss as to how to proceed, as it ‘knows 
neither when to start nor when to stop 
evaluating costs and benefits’ (de Sousa 
1990, p: 330). In practical thought 
emotions are said to be probably bodily 
felt because they are ‘on-line’ 
(Charland, 1998b). However, a 
spontaneous emotion-driven decision 
may be considered problematic from 
the viewpoint of the agent who 
therefore adapts it both consciously and 
unconsciously (den Hartogh, 2016). 
Second. Reasoning is considered as 
including value-based reasoning. Some 
philosophers place great weigh on 
values in practical reasoning (Atkinson 
and Bench- Capon, 2008). Appreciation 
is one of the four stages an individual 
has to go through to convey an optimal 
decision-making process (Grisso, 
Appelbaum, 1998). It is a versatile 
concept (Hermann et al., 2016). 
However, it should rather be regarded 
as is including emotional and 
valuational processing (Hermann et al. 
2016). Besides, it may be necessary for 
value-based reasoning (Karel et al., 
2010). A ‘relatively stable set of values’ 
which is at least minimally consistent is 
a requirement for decision-making 
competence (Buchanan and Brock, 
1989, p: 84). Two concepts are 
required: a developed set of values and 
their stability (which, however, is 
difficult to be established over time). 
The values of a person are said to derive 
from their emotions (emotion-driven 
values). Presumably, the values proceed 
directly from same mechanisms that 
generate or sustain the emotions 
(Charland, 1998b). Note, however, that 
pathogenic values may be less 
problematic for decision-making 
process than other not considered 
pathogenic but eccentric values.  
At any rate, it is crucial to bear in mind 
that both emotions and values may not 
only facilitate but also impede a 
decision-making process. Whilst 
emotions facilitate smooth-running 
autonomous decision-making 
processes, they may impede them by 
affecting the internal consistency 
between first and second order desires / 
choices (e.g. in states of phobias or 
addiction) (Hermann et al., 2016). 
However, a   patient may be decision-
making competent even if their first-
order desires / choices are not in 
consistency with their second-order 
ones, namely, has not autonomy. It 
should be highlighted that decision-
making competence is not identical to 
personal autonomy. Besides, emotions 
may negatively affect the perception of 
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reality or the epistemic beliefs (i.e. 
about the future) (Hermann et al., 
2016). It is noteworthy that we may be 
self-deceived in our emotional 
responses. De Sousa (2017) provides 
three sources of emotional self-
deception. In ‘pathogenic affective 
states’ (Charland, 2013) (although such 
states are mostly ill-defined) the 
emotions may be problematic, thus 
making also problematic the role of the 
values derived from or based on them. 
As to values, they may be inauthentic or 
pathological (Tan et al., 2006), even 
though the line of distinction between 
normal and pathological values may 
often be blurred. Importantly, it is no 
clear whether pathological values are 
these closely allied to illness or these 
considered “unreasonable” from a third 
party’s standpoint. 
Importantly, as Hermann et al. (2016) 
argue, it is difficult to formulate 
universally applicable criteria regarding 
the accurate role of values and emotions 
in decision-making capacity 
assessment. Hermann et al. (2016) state 
that ‘substantive account of emotions 
and values appears particularly case-
sensitive…’ and that emotions and 
values ‘cannot be judged in isolation 
but only in light of their interaction with 
each other and with other factors’.  
Summing up: Emotions are not separate 
from cognition.  Sharp distinction 
between rational and emotional 
decisions would be a false dichotomy. 
Both values and emotions underpin 
every aspect of a decision-making 
process (Charland, 1998; Hermann et 
al., 2016). Without values and emotions 
decision-makers are at a loss due to the 
fact that they are in the face of an 
endless number of potential alternative 
options. Lack of emotions or adequately 
elaborated pattern of values constitutes 
apparently inherent obstacles to 
obtaining a decision-making process 
that effectively serves the purpose of 
protecting or promoting decider’s 
autonomy.   Decision-making process is 
a dynamic process and as such the 
values that are assigned and the 
emotions that are implicated in every 
aspect of it may considerably vary.  
Current scholarship lacks a nuanced and 
comprehensive understanding of the 
accurate role of emotions and values in 
decision-making capacity as well as the 
accurate mechanisms by which they 
contribute to it. It would be highly 
interesting to further explore the 
mechanism by which values affect 
decision-making process as well as the 
dynamic of values and emotions in 
regard to the various aspects of a 
decision-making process. Particularly, 
when it comes to multi-phase and multi-
dimensional decision-making 
processes, i.e. young women’s fertility 
preservation decision-making process 
following cancer diagnosis. 
(Hershberger, 2013).  
Elaborating on the role of emotions in 
decision making 
A certain degree (not lack or excess) of 
emotional involvement seems to be 
essential for a person to appreciate 
(understand in more experiential sense) 
the external and internal to her world 
(Charland, 1998). Emotions often 
reflect a decider’s important underlying 
values that are strictly and stably allied 
to their narrative identity and hence, are 
keys to decision making. Without 
emotional involvement practical 
thought (judgment) may be at a loss as 
to how to proceed, as it ‘knows neither 
when to start nor when to stop 
evaluating costs and benefits’ (de Sousa 
1990, 330). In that connection, it must 
be noted that the Aristotelean notion of 
‘phronesis’ (practical wisdom) that may 
play a crucial role in making certain 
clinical decisions includes finding a 
balance between extreme emotions 
(Widdershoven et al., 2017). 
Different theories have been proposed 
to explain the role of emotions in 
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decision making (Bandyopadhyay et 
al., 2013). Interestingly, emotional 
influences may affect not only the 
decision process but also post-decision 
experience ‘as a function of 
uncertainty’ (Bandyopadhyay et al., 
2013). Emotions seem to influence the 
way that options and the surrounding 
information are interpreted and used 
(Mazzocco et al., 2019). Emotions may 
interact with situational factors to 
improve or degrade health-related 
decisions (Ferrer et al., 2016). Emotions 
can interfere with decision-making 
(Paulus and Yu, 2012).  Lerner et al. 
(2015) concluded from their research 
that ‘emotions constitute potent, 
pervasive, predictable, sometimes 
harmful and sometimes beneficial 
drivers of decision making.’ Mazzocco 
et al. (2019) found that ‘emotion's 
intensity level’ and ‘cognitive 
appraisal’ interact in shaping the 
decision.  Ferrer et al. (2016) write that 
emotion also influences perspective-
taking; shame decreases perspective-
taking ability compared to guilt, 
perhaps because shame is more self-
focused (Yang, Yang, & Chiou, 2010). 
Potential moderating factors affecting 
the effect of emotions on the complex 
non-linear decision-making processes 
should be further investigated 
(Mazzocco et al., 2019). At any rate, 
Ferrer and Mendes (2018) put it best in 
saying that ‘the relative dearth of 
research focused on how affective states 
contribute to and influence health 
decision-making and behaviour is an 
important gap in the literature.’  
Emotions are complex and 
contextualized continuous interaction 
between conscious, unconscious and 
fringe conscious processes (Baars, 
1993). Lufityanto et al. (2016) argue 
that non-conscious emotional 
information can boost accuracy and 
confidence in a concurrent non-
emotional decision task.   Fuzzy-trace 
Theory is a dual-process approach that 
distinguishes two kinds of mental 
representations of information: 
verbatim and gist. Reyna et al. (2015) 
state that verbatim representations are 
encoded in parallel with gist (including 
emotional gist) representations support 
the fuzzy, parallel, usually unconscious 
processes of intuition.’ In the clinical 
context, perceived emotional threats 
affect physician cognition and may lead 
to responses such as rumination or 
thought looping in unknown ways 
(Childers and Arnold, 2019). Emotions 
may affect physician’s clinical 
decisions on a level that is not entirely 
conscious (Kligyte et al., 2013; 
Kozlowski et al., 2017).  
Further research is needed to shed more 
light on the topic about the role of 
emotions in decision making. 
The awareness of values and 
emotions 
Before jumping into making 
autonomous decisions and then acting 
according to them, a decision-maker 
has to be merely aware of and then 
navigate his/her own experiences, 
feelings and values as well as those of 
their environment, which subsequently 
will affect their decision-making 
process in both conscious and 
unconscious ways (Berg et al., 2001; 
Sweeney, 2008, Hermann et al., 2016). 
An important stepping stone for 
decision-making is the use of self-
exploration (involving introspective 
attention) to become merely aware of 
one’s own situation, previous 
experiences, emotions and set of values 
(located in one’s inner context, which 
are stable over time and closely allied to 
her narrative identity) and then to 
connect them with external to them 
information. The awareness of one’s 
cognitive, emotional and motivational 
limitations in literature is referred to as 
‘meta-cognition’ and allows her to 
determine her impaired decision-
making competence (Ryan-Durby and 
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Dickerson, 2018). Individuals may need 
to reflect, meta-reflect on their inner 
storyline (experiences, turning points 
etc), thereby reconstructing their 
narrative identity against a context of a 
rather relativist and dynamic world.  
Narrative identity shows how a person 
understands her own autobiography, 
including her dispositional 
characteristics also referred to as 
personality, as well as a collection of 
experiences and values (and hence 
propositional attitudes like preferences, 
beliefs and desires), especially those 
that mostly matter to her (Glannon, 
2009; Jecker, Ko, 2017). Narrative 
identity is a changeable and dynamic 
matter of degree since it ‘requires 
cognitive capabilities that can be 
present to a greater or a lesser extent’ 
(Jecker, Ko, 2017). Moreover, narrative 
identity is dynamic and changeable. It 
may change over time. It is to be 
highlighted that patients may refuse 
medical treatment due to unauthentic 
belief that certain values are closely 
allied to their identity (e.g. in anorexia 
nervosa). Since narrative identity is a 
changeable matter, it would be an 
additional difficult task to assess 
whether a certain patient has a 
developed and coherent pattern of 
values that are (at least to a small 
extent) constantly related to her 
(narrative) identity at least over a 
certain period of her life. 
Given the truth of the assumption that 
values are inherent in the decision-
making process the assessment of 
decision-making competence 
necessarily involves consideration of 
values (Breden and Vollmann, 2004). A 
decision-maker has to be aware of and 
then navigate his/her own experiences, 
feelings and values as well as those of 
their environment, which subsequently 
will affect their decision-making 
process in both conscious and 
unconscious ways (Berg et al., 2001, 
p:105; Sweeney, 2008). An important 
stepping stone for decision-making is 
the use of self-exploration (involving 
introspective attention) to become 
aware of one’s own situation, previous 
experiences and  values (located in the 
inner context), and then to connect them 
with external to them information, thus 
becoming (as much as possible) ‘fully’ 
engaged in a decision-making 
procedure that leads them to achieve 
health-enhancing goals / outcomes in 
full congruence with their values, 
previous experiences and actual 
situation.  
Interestingly, when it comes to higher 
cognitive functions the relationship 
between attention and awareness is a 
topic that matters. More particularly, 
when it comes to the awareness of one’s 
own values and emotions, what matters 
is the relationship between one’s 
awareness and introspective attention. 
This relationship involves automatic 
procedures   where cognitive or 
automatic biases may be involved to a 
lesser or greater extent. Indeed, 
attention normally accompanies a 
procedure of awareness and participates 
in the mechanism of binding awareness 
to a stimulus representation. Graziano 
and Kastner (2011a) view a complex 
relationship between attention and 
awareness. Graziano and Kastner 
(2011a) suggest that the consciousness 
of information passing through one’s 
neuronal networks can be constructed 
by specialized neuronal ‘social 
perceptual machinery’ that serves the 
social intelligence as well as the 
perception of awareness in ourselves. 
They consider that awareness is a 
‘perceptual model of the process of 
attention’ (Graziano and Kastner, 
2011b). They argue for a similarity 
between perceiving someone else’s 
awareness and perceiving one’s own 
awareness. They consider that 
awareness is a ‘product of social 
perception’.  
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The authors state that it is possible to 
attend to an object without awareness of 
it whereas it is difficult to obtain robust 
and consistent awareness of an object 
without attention to it. Attention is 
something the brain does (procedural), 
not something it knows (as awareness 
is). Indeed, attention seems to be active 
though rather automatic procedure 
whereas awareness seems to be passive 
though subjectively conscious 
procedure.  
The examination (subjective 
description) of one's own conscious 
thoughts, values and preferences, 
experiences and feelings is a product of 
introspective consciousness, which 
however, may be a matter of bias due to 
the fact that introspective illusion may 
occur as a form of cognitive bias 
(Pronin, Gilovich and Ross, 2004; 
Pronin, 2009, pp: 1-67). Besides, the 
construction of social reality by one’s 
brain may be negatively affected by 
cognitive biases that may influence 
one’s perceptions, judgments and 
interpretations. Attention and 
development of ‘social perceptional 
machinery’ (which according to 
Graziano and Kastner (2011b) 
‘constructs awareness’) is likely to be a 
matter of degree. Underlying 
attentional biases (predisposition 
towards paying more attention to 
process certain types of information) 
may result in awareness deficit 
(neglect). The accurate mechanism by 
which attention influences the obtaining 
of robust and consistent awareness 
remains to be further explored.  
In short, emotions may not only affect 
the development of the values of an 
individual, but also affect an 
individual’s introspective awareness of 
her values, beliefs and preferences. 
Moreover, it is crucial to bear in mind 
that a) it is most likely that awareness is 
a ‘perceptual property’ (Graziano and 
Kastner, 2011a). Furthermore, b) it has 
been argued that there is a quasi-
perceptual account of the nature of 
emotions (de Sousa, 1990) and 
emotions may negatively affect the 
perception of reality. Moreover, c) 
introspective awareness may have a 
crucial role in decision-making process 
(Pronin, 2009). 
Below, I go into topics strictly related to 
the role of values and emotions in 
decision-making process and 
assessment of decision-making 
competence.  
The ‘internal rationality’ 
Charland (2001) regards ‘internal 
rationality’ as a requirement for 
decision-making competence. Internal 
rationality means that a decision 
intellectually coheres with the set of 
one’s personal value system, is justified 
as being based on them and can be 
considered reasonable from the 
standpoint of an assessor who has not to 
share that personal value system built 
on the patient’s own terms. Patients can 
fit her decision into her personal 
(intelligible from their own standpoint) 
concept of the human good. Irrational 
decisions may be judged internally 
reasonable decisions. However, it 
cannot always be established with 
reliable accuracy the internal 
reasonableness of another’s decision. 
Interestingly, Davidson (2004, p: 67) 
who focuses upon problems such as the 
nature and our understanding of value 
judgments, plausibly argues that 
intrapersonal comparisons involving 
the assessor’s own values are rather 
inevitable when considering 
reasonableness of another’s decision. 
Interpersonal comparisons of value 
judgments are thought of as being 
inherent in the very activity of 
interpretation. 
In addition, a deeper consideration of 
the decision-making processing reveals 
that the difficulty in establishing with 
reliable accuracy the internal 
reasonableness of another’s decision 
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may in reality be much greater than the 
at first look anticipated one. De Sousa 
(1990) has sketched an account of the 
rationality conditions for an emotion 
(thus defending the so-called emotional 
rationality), and therefore, he provides a 
quasi-perceptual account of the nature 
of emotion.  Given the truth of the 
assumption that emotions can be 
subjected to assessment of rationality 
(and if so, in what sense and to what 
extend?) and provided that emotions 
underpin every aspect of a decision-
making process, the internal 
reasonableness of another’s decision 
can be established with much less 
accuracy.  The intrapersonal 
comparison may be to a greater extent 
unavoidable due to the fact that it 
cannot always be established with 
reliable accuracy the rationality of 
another’s emotional reaction which 
influences her decision-making 
process.  
The role of practical wisdom  
Practical thought is so-called because it 
aims at action (praxis). The excellence 
of practical thought is practical wisdom 
or prudence (phronesis), which issues 
in true  judgments about actions that are 
good or bad for a human-being 
(Lobban, 2010). The Aristotelean 
notion of practical wisdom means to be 
able to do the right thing at the right 
time under the concrete circumstances. 
(Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010) Practical 
wisdom means to be able to choose the 
right way among different ways. For 
doing so, it is necessary the knowledge 
of what is good and the capacity to act 
accordingly. Practical wisdom is a 
product of experience which, however, 
is a mainly intellectual virtue. It 
includes the ability to be practically 
intelligent, or conscious of your values. 
However, practical wisdom is not all 
rational. Emotions may also be central 
to practical wisdom (Roberts, 2017).  
The capacity for practical wisdom 
encompasses the ability to generally 
conceive what is good, as well as to 
perceive, feel, deliberate, discern, and 
then make choices and act accordingly. 
Emotive and evaluative abilities may 
have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of this procedure. 
Swartwood (2013a) argues that 
practical wisdom is expert decision-
making skill which includes 
‘substantial intuitive and deliberative 
and reflective abilities’. The author 
states that this skill is comprised of 
three component abilities: The intuitive 
ability (involving the use of effortless 
processes), the deliberative ability 
(involving the use of effortful 
processes) and the meta-cognitive 
ability ‘to decide when and how to rely 
on intuition and deliberation’ 
(Swartwood, 2013a). Besides, 
Swartwood (2013a) considers two other 
abilities in addition to the 
aforementioned: Self-regulative ability 
(namely, ability to identify how to 
affect her environment, behavior, affect 
and motivations in order to achieve her 
goals) and self-cultivation ability 
(namely, ability to make her 
aforementioned abilities ‘even more 
reliable over the long-run’). 
 Interestingly, Nussbaum states that 
wisdom involves ‘a quasi-perceptual 
capacity to see what to do’ (2001, p: 
300). Quasi-perceptual experience is 
the one that resembles perceptual 
experience but occurs in the absence of 
the appropriate external stimuli. In my 
opinion, this perceptual experience may 
involve spontaneous intuitions and/or 
products of deliberation. 
Practical wisdom is a matter of degree. 
It is developed through experience and 
can be cultivated more or less 
successfully (Swartwood, 2013b). 
Interestingly, it can actually be 
developed as expert skill, through 
‘deliberate practice that gives a person 
feedback on the quality of their 
decisions’ (Swartwood 2013b). 
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Swartwood consider available this kind 
of feedback. 
Practical wisdom is highly valuable for 
sound decision-making, not only 
because it is the excellence of practical 
thought but also because it is essential 
for orchestrizing the values of a person 
into an effective and happy life. That is 
to say, into a meaningful, fully engaged, 
successful and balanced life, not simply 
as positive emotion. Swartwood 
(2013a) states that practical wisdom is a 
‘high-level achievement’ that ‘enables a 
person to make reliably good decisions 
about how, all-things-considered, to 
live.’  Positive emotion might be 
obtained by only cultivating just one 
‘signature strength’.  However, as 
Schwartz and Sharpe (2006) argue this 
would product neither Aristotelian 
‘eudemonia’ nor ‘authentic happiness’ 
of Seligman’s (2002), a pioneer of 
positive psychology who scientifically 
explores why people are happy. 
Practical wisdom is to find a right and 
context-specific balance among 
interdependent virtues which are 
necessary to exist only to an appropriate 
extent. More of a virtue would not 
always be better.  
Patients may have to process the 
provided information to reach medical 
decisions making choices within a 
spectrum of scenarios. This is a highly 
demanding and complex task, that 
involves processes such as the 
following: to appreciate, deliberate, 
interpret, weigh, balance, and perhaps 
to weave (perhaps unpredictable) 
events or make choices in light of their 
idiosyncrasy and in congruence with 
their more or less stable and coherent 
set of values. For doing so, they have to 
find a balance between their extreme 
emotions and values and engage 
themselves in decision-making 
procedures leading to achieving 
intelligible life goals that are 
meaningful and fully-engaged from 
their own point of view.  In other words, 
practical wisdom seems essential for 
decision-making competence of 
patients who consider medically 
indicated treatment.    
More in particular, in case of serious 
mental illness such as severe dementia 
or paranoid delusions, the line between 
decision-making competence and 
incompetence is less difficult to draw as 
compared to other cases of less serious 
mental illness such as anorexia nervosa 
or obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD) where matters may be less clear. 
Indeed, practical insight is of 
paramount importance in decision-
making regarding a medical treatment 
and as such should be facilitated by the 
physician, provided that medical 
responsibility is thought of as being 
enhanced and having a prevalent role in 
the context of clinical practice. Patients’ 
abilities to gain practical insight and 
engage themselves in decision-making 
procedures leading to achieving 
intelligible goals of (meaningful from 
their own perspective)  personal life 
may be viewed as elements that might 
compensate the deficit of cognitive 
(reasoning) capacity, which, as it has 
already anticipated above, does not 
necessarily deprive a person from her 
decision-making capacity.  
Furthermore, a patient decision-maker 
has to balance all the relevant 
considerations before making any final 
decision on treatment acceptance or 
refusal. As den Hartogh (2016) puts it, 
decision-making is a multi-dimensional 
process that should be assessed “on 
several relevant dimensions at the same 
time”.  For instance, in the realm of 
health care decisions, a patient may be 
at a loss as to what to decide when 
balancing risks and benefits of a 
treatment, with tradeoffs between 
quantity and quality of life. Note, 
however, that decision-making capacity 
is neither a permanent condition nor an 
‘all or nothing’ concept, namely, a 
patient may be competent to make 
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certain decisions but not others 
(Ganzini et al., 2005). The decision-
making mental abilities constitute only 
a part of multi-dimensional judgment 
involving considerations to be 
balanced, such as the harmfulness and 
invasiveness of an intervention, the 
infringement of patient’s autonomy, the 
centrality of the decision (and the 
values that it concerns) to the way 
patients lead their own life and have 
their own sense of their narrative 
identity. den Hartogh (2016) considers 
that these important considerations and 
decision-making mental abilities bear 
equal weights, thus considering that the 
line of distinction between soft and hard 
paternalism is blurred. Besides, given 
the truth of this assumption, the 
threshold of decision-making 
competence becomes blurred and 
shifting because of the multifactorial 
(almost chaotic) ontology of decision-
making process. Therefore, in author’s 
opinion, decision-making science 
advance can make the decision-making 
threshold less cloudy though not well-
defined.  
At any rate, the balancing of different 
though relevant considerations is a 
difficult and complex task that seems 
too subtle to be dictated by rules. 
Practical wisdom seems necessary to 
address such a balancing and so to 
convey an optimal decision-making 
process.  
Widdershoven et al. (2017) offer an 
alternative approach to decision-
making competence which is 
alternative to both the standard 
(focusing on cognitive abilities) and the 
challenging it (focusing on the role of 
emotions and values) approach to 
decision-making competence. They 
appeal to the Aristotelean notion of 
‘phronesis’ (practical wisdom) that –
according to the authors-combines a) 
knowing  (argumentative or not) the 
‘right thing to do’, b) having adequate 
emotions and finding a balance between 
extreme emotions,  and c) finding a 
balance between various values and 
enacting them in meaningful and 
successful personal life.  
The approach of decision-making 
competence that focuses on practical 
wisdom seems ‘intuitively attractive 
and practically helpful’ (Boyd, 2017), 
particularly when the line of distinction 
between competence and incompetence 
is blurred. Further research is needed to 
be conducted with a much larger 
number of participants compared to the 
earlier study of Widderhoven et al. 
(2017) suffering from a broader 
spectrum of chronic mental disorders, 
to confirm the validity of practical 
wisdom as criteria for decision-making 
competence. 
Conclusion 
Sharp distinction between rational and 
emotional decisions would be a false 
dichotomy. Both values and emotions 
underpin every aspect of a decision-
making process. Decision-making 
process is a dynamic process and as 
such the values that are assigned and the 
emotions that are implicated in every 
aspect of it may considerably vary.  The 
ways by which beliefs, values, and 
emotions affect decision-making 
processes seem to be unclear and 
overlapping, thus giving a boost to 
uncertainties. It is important to bear in 
mind that intrapersonal comparisons 
involving the assessor’s own values are 
rather inevitable when considering 
reasonableness of another’s decision. 
Moreover, as decision-makers has to be 
aware of and then navigate their own, 
feelings and values, it is noticeable that 
the relationship between introspective 
attention and awareness is a topic that 
matters. Emotions may not only affect 
the development of the values of an 
individual, but also affect an 
individual’s introspective awareness of 
her values, beliefs and preferences. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that it 
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has been suggested an alternative 
approach to decision-making 
competence, which is alternative to 
both the standard approach (focusing on 
cognitive abilities) and the challenging 
it one (focusing on the role of emotions 
and values). This approach is based on 
decision-maker’s practical wisdom. 
Further research into complexities such 
as continuums, blurry distinctions, and 
uncertainties related to the role of 
values and emotions in decision making 
seems to be necessary.   
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